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a b s t r a c t
Salience theory has been successfully used to explain a wide range of empirical and experimental
phenomena such as the Allais paradox, framing effect, the preference reversal phenomenon or the
decoy and compromise effects. In this paper we show that salience theory carries a notable flaw and
under certain circumstances it suggests that a salient thinker may prefer a dominated option even
when a strictly dominant alternative is available to her. To solve this problem we propose a possible
alteration of the theory and show how it accounts for the same phenomena as the salience theory.
© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Salience theory (Bordalo et al., 2012a and Bordalo et al., 2013a)
accounts for paradoxes such as the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953),
the preference reversal phenomenon (Lichtenstein and Slovic,
1971) and the framing effect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981),
phenomena that the classical theory of expected utility cannot
be made compatible with. Furthermore, salience theory provides
an explanation for some regular quirks of non-binary decision
making as well, such as the asymmetric dominance, also known
as decoy effect (Huber et al., 1982) or the compromise effect
(Simonson, 1989). According to salience theory decisions are not
made in a vacuum, but rather in a comparative context and deci-
sion makers contrast the attributes of an option to the features of
other available alternatives when facing a decision. An attribute
of an option is being said to be salient if it stands out relative to its
average level in the choice context. The premise of the theory is
that salient characteristics get more focus and thus are dispropor-
tionately overweighted compared to other more average or less-
salient features during the thought process. As a consequence
the decision maker might choose an option which has more
salient features. However, this choice might not necessary be the
‘best’ outcome one would expect based on the classical rational
choice theory.1 Remarkably, the theory, albeit simple, provides
explanations for the paradoxes mentioned above and it has been
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1 One might argue that decisions based on salience are rational given that
information needed for a sound decision are limited and costly. This reasoning,
however, assumes that decision makers allocate efficiently their attention to
applied for choices under risk (Bordalo et al., 2012a), asset pricing
(Bordalo et al., 2013b), judicial decisions (Bordalo et al., 2015) or
even for multi-attribute consumer choices (Bordalo et al., 2013a).
Yet, the theory carries a rather peculiar feature, which to
our knowledge has never been addressed in the literature. It
suggests that a salient thinker (sometimes referred to as local
thinker) might be better off choosing a dominated alternative
even when a strictly dominant option, i.e. an alternative which
yields strictly higher payoffs than any other alternative in every
state, is available. It is hard to believe that decision makers, no
matter how much of a salient thinker they might be, would
choose a dominated alternative when an obvious best option is
available to them.2
In this article we address this issue of salience theory and
suggest an alteration of it which tackles this problem. In order
to do so we change focus from the decision makers’ utility to
her regret when measuring the value of a prospect in salience
theory. More specifically, we consider regret as the main subject
of a decision, and instead of focusing on the decision maker’s
utility she might gain by choosing an alternative we focus on her
disutility she may experience when this option is not yielding the
best attainable payoff of the prospect. The idea of using regret to
explain human behaviour is not new. It was introduced simul-
taneously by Loomes and Sugden (1982) and Bell (1982) and has
different features of a choice ex ante, while in salience theory and so as in
this paper we assume that attention is being focused ex post on the salient
attributes. For more on models with rationally inattentive decision makers see
e.g. Matejka and McKay (2012) or Gabaix (2014).
2 Another odd feature of the theory was presented by Kontek (2016), who
shows that the lottery certainty equivalent is undefined for certain ranges of
probabilities.
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been extensively investigated ever since. We use the specification
of the model of Quiggin (1994) for regret which has been applied
to explain many empirical phenomena with success, for instance,
for understanding demand for insurance (Braun and Muermann,
2004), transportation choices (Chorus et al., 2014), or asset pric-
ing (Qin, 2020). Considering the same context-dependent frame-
work as salience theory we show that the theory we propose, the
salient regret theory, overcomes the above mentioned problem
of the salience theory and it accounts for the same phenomena,
namely the Allais paradox, framing effect, preference reversal,
asymmetric dominance and compromise effect.
2. Salience theory and the preference for a dominated alter-
native
In order to understand the oddity of the theory, let us first
summarize its formal framework as proposed by Bordalo et al.
(2012a).
Consider a choice problem with a choice set of {L1, . . . , LN},
where Li are risky prospects (lotteries) defined over a finite state
space S with objective and known probabilities, πs, for each s ∈ S
such that
∑
s∈S πs = 1. The payoffs of state s are given with the
payoff vector xs = (x1s , . . . , x
N
s }. The decision maker chooses a
lottery based on the lotteries’ perceived values. These, however,
are distorted to some extent from their intrinsic values because
the lotteries’ salient features are inflated at the expense of their
less-salient attributes. The salience of a lottery in a given state is
captured by a continuous and bounded function σ (xis, x−is ), where
x−is is the payoff vector for all lotteries except for lottery i in state
s. More specifically, it is assumed that
σ (xis, x
−i
s ) =
|xis − f (x−is )|
|xis| + |f (x
−i
s )|
(1)
where f (x−is ) =
1
N−1
∑
j̸=i x
j
s. Thus, a lottery’s salience in state s
depends on the magnitude of the difference between its payoff
and the average payoff all other available lotteries yield in the
same state.3 According to the theory the salient thinker ranks the
states for each lottery Li based on the salience function’s values
such that a higher value implies a lower ranking, and distorts the
decision weights of her value function in the following way
V LT (Li) =
∑
s∈S
π isv(x
i
s) (2)
where π is = πsω
i
s, while ω
i
s =
δk
i
s∑
r∈S δ
kir πr
and kit is the salience
ranking of state t ∈ S for lottery Li and δ ∈ (0, 1]. Furthermore,
it is assume that v(·) is a strictly increasing and concave value
function for which v(0) = 0.4
Now, let us demonstrate a surprising oddity of this framework
with the following example. Consider four lotteries {L1, L2, L3, L4}
with the state space of {s1, s2}, both with equal probability as it
is presented in the following table. Assume that δ = 0.7 and
v(xis) = x
i
s. One can think of s1 as a bad state, while s2 as a
good state. The penultimate column of the table (V (Li)) shows the
intrinsic value of a lottery that a rational decision maker would
assign to the lottery, while the last column represents the amount
3 In some applications it is assumed that the salience of a lottery in state
s depends on the contrast between its payoff and the average payoff of all
available lotteries in state s including lottery i (see e.g. Bordalo et al., 2013a
or Bordalo et al., 2012b). Furthermore, in Bordalo et al. (2012a) the salience
function is defined with an added positive constant to the denominator. Our
result does not depend on the particular specification of the salience function.
4 Notice, that we assume a more general value function than as it is
in Bordalo et al. (2012a) and Bordalo et al. (2013a) where a linear value function
is being considered.
that a local thinker would value the lottery for, after over- or
underweighting its salient or less-salient payoffs, according to
their salience given by σ is1 and σ
i
s2 .
5
xi1 x
i
2 σ
i
s1 σ
i
s2 V (Li) V
LT (Li)
L1 9 45 4/5 4/131 27 23.82
L2 0 44 1 1/65 22 18.12
L3 0 43 1 0 21.5 17.71
L4 3 40 0 1/21 21.5 24.76
Notice that lottery L1 is a strictly dominant alternative and
it yields the highest payoffs in both states. Not surprisingly, a
rational decision maker would prefer this lottery over any other
alternative as we can see from the penultimate column of the
table. Yet, a local thinker behaves differently. After distorting the
odds based on the lotteries’ salient payoffs as it is suggested by
the theory and described in (2) she prefers lottery L4 over any
other option. As we can see from the table the bad state is salient
for lotteries L1, L2 and L3, while for lottery L4 the good state gets
the focus. Thus, the local thinker overweights L1’s low payoff and
underweights its high payoff, while exactly the opposite happens
for L4. Intuitively, too much weight is being put on L1’s low payoff
which makes the decision maker to choose L4, a choice in which
a dominated alternative is being preferred over a dominant one.
This result, though not driven by any particular odd assump-
tion, is counter-intuitive. In order to prevent such an outcome we
propose a simple alteration of the theory and we argue that by
using a regret function as the value function we can eliminate this
counter-intuitive result while retaining the explanatory power
of the theory. The reason a dominated option might be chosen
by the decision maker is that the salience function treats any
difference from the average, being positive or negative, the same.
Therefore, it might happen that a prospect’s good state is salient
because its value negatively differs the most from the state’s
average value. In other words a prospect’s good state, and as a
consequence the prospect itself, might be overvalued because the
prospect has the worst outcome among the available prospects
in the good state. This undesirable outcome can be prevented
by using regret as the value function, since the regret attached
to a dominant alternative is always zero and non-negative for
any alternative choice. Thus, no matter how a salient thinker
would under- or overvalue the regrets associated with an alter-
native’s realizations, the dominant option would always be the
best choice to make for the decision maker. In the following we
will prove this result in a more general way.
3. Salient regret theory
We consider a choice problem similar to the one presented
above, however, instead of assuming that the decision maker
maximizes her value function given by expression (2) we assume
that she is minimizing her regret accompanied with any choice
that is not the best available option in the given state.
Following Quiggin (1994) we define regret (r is) as a state de-
pendent variable characterizing a lottery i in a given state s and
we assume that it equals the difference between the payoff re-
ceived by choosing the lottery in question and the highest possi-
ble payoff realization available in the given state. More precisely,
5 In this example we assume that a lottery’s salience depends on the
difference between the lottery’s payoff and the average payoff of all the other
lotteries in a given state. One can easily verify that the result holds true when
the salience is calculated as the difference between the lottery’s payoff and the
total average in a specific state.
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Definition 1 (Regret Value). r is ≡ xHs − xis, where xHs is the highest
possible payoff in state s considering all available lotteries.
The problem of a rational decision maker who is minimizing
the regret she might have by not receiving the highest possible
payoff is given as follows
min
i
R(Li) =
∑
s∈S
πsv(r is) (3)
A salient regret thinker, however, inflates the lotteries’ most
salient regrets and distorts the odds in the same way as it is
suggested by the salient theory. Thus, in her case the value
function is
RLT (Li) =
∑
s∈S
ωisπsv(r
i
s), (4)
where ωis is defined in expression (2).
6 Notice, that this regret-
based evaluation relies on the exact same parameters as salience
theory and there are no extra variables added to the original
model.7 We can state the following
Proposition 1. Let Li be a strictly dominant lottery. A salient regret
thinker always prefers Li to any other available lottery. I.e. if xis > x
j
s,
where i ̸= j for any s it follows that Li ≻ Lj.
Proof. In case of Li we have that RLT (Li) = 0 since Li has the
highest possible payoffs in each state by definition. On the other
hand, for any j ̸= i, RLT (Lj) > 0, because at least in one state it is
characterized with a positive regret value. Thus, a salient thinker
prefers Li over any other lottery. □
Proposition 1 implies that a salient regret thinker would al-
ways choose a strictly dominant lottery when that is available in
the choice set.
Furthermore, we can state the following
Proposition 2. Consider a binary choice set of {Li, L−i}.
∑
s∈S π
i
sv
(xis) >
∑
s∈S π
−i
s v(x
−i
s ) iff
∑
s∈S π
i
sv(r
i
s) <
∑
s∈S π
−i
s v(r
−i
s ).
Proof. Having only two lotteries in the choice set we have that
kis = k
−i
s and as a consequence ω
i
s = ω
−i
s , hence we can drop the
superscripts in ωis. From
∑
s∈S π
i
sv(x
i
s) >
∑
s∈S π
−i
s v(x
−i
s ) we have
that∑
s∈S
πsωs(v(xis) − v(x
−i
s )) > 0. (5)
Given that v(·) is strictly increasing, concave function and v(0) =
0 it follows that v
(
xis−x
−i
s
2
)
>
v(xis)−v(x
−i
s )
2 for all s, thus inequality
(5) can be written as∑
s∈S
πsωsv(xis − x
−i
s ) > 0. (6)
Furthermore, inequality (6) is equivalent with∑
s∈S
πsωsv((xis − x
H
s ) − (x
−i
s − x
H
s )) > 0
6 We use the same salience function as in Bordalo et al. (2012a) in order to
reduce the number of changes compared to the original salience theory.
7 Bordalo et al. (2020) propose a new model in which they define the
value of an attribute as the difference between its observed value and a norm.
Although this approach exhibits some similarities to our approach, there are
several important differences as well. First, they introduce new norm parameters
for each attribute independent from the choice set, while in this article we
do not need any new parameter compared to the previous salience models.
Second, Bordalo et al. (2020) introduce a new salience function which is not
relative anymore, and as a consequence, all attributes can be salient at the same
time, while we keep the original salience function which overweights certain
attributes at the expense of the others.
or∑
s∈S
πsωsv((xHs − x
i
s) − (x
H
s − x
−i
s )) < 0
which because of concavity leads to∑
s∈S
πsωs(v(xHs − x
i
s) − v(x
H
s − x
−i
s )) < 0
or∑
s∈S
πsωsv(r is) <
∑
s∈S
πsωsv(r−is ). □
Proposition 2 implies that with any binary choice set salient
regret theory yields the same result as salience theory and there-
fore it provides explanation for the Allais paradox, preference
reversal and framing effect.
So far we have considered only binary choices, yet salience
theory can account for phenomena observed with non-binary
choices, such as the decoy and compromise effects (Bordalo et al.,
2013a).
Consider a choice problem of two-attribute (e.g. quality and
price) goods. According to salience theory an attribute of a good
is considered salient if the good stands out in that attribute from
the other goods available in the choice set. More specifically, a
good’s salient attributes are those which are the furthest from
the reference good which is defined with the average values of
the attributes. Let the choice set be C = {(qs, ps)}s=1,...,N , where qs
stands for the quality, and ps for the price of good s = {1, . . . ,N}.
Analogously to Bordalo et al. (2013a), we assume that the decision
maker intrinsic utility is linear in attributes, both measured in
dollars. Furthermore, we assume that she minimizes her regret
function which is given by rs = (qH − qs) − (pL − ps), where
qH ≡ max{q1, . . . , qN} and pL ≡ min{p1, . . . , pN}, i.e., qH is the
highest quality and pL is the lowest price available.
A salient thinker distorts the relative weight attached to the
attributes in such a way that a salient attribute gets a higher
weight, and the attribute which is close to the average level of
the same attribute gets a lower weight. More specifically, the local
thinker’s (dis)utility of good s is
rLTs =
⎧⎨⎩ (q
H
− qs) − δ(pL − ps) if σ (qs, q̄) > σ (ps, p̄)
δ(qH − qs) − (pL − ps) if σ (qs, q̄) < σ (ps, p̄)
(qH − qs) − (pL − ps) if σ (qs, q̄) = σ (ps, p̄)
(7)
where δ ∈ (0, 1]
To show how salient regret theory can account for asymmetric
dominance (decoy effect) let us consider a choice problem similar
as in Bordalo et al. (2013a). Formally,
Proposition 3. Assume a choice set of two available options,
i.e. C = {(ql, pl), (qh, ph)} and assume that (qh − ql)(ph − pl) > 0,
that is, the high quality product neither dominates nor is dominated
by the other available option. Furthermore, assume that rLTh < r
LT
l
only if σ (qh, q̄) > σ (ph, p̄), and the low quality good is being chosen
by the decision maker otherwise. Let Cd = C∪(qd, pd) where (qd, pd)
is a decoy good with qd < qh and pd > pl. Moreover, let us assume
that ql/pl > qh/ph. For any (qd, pd) satisfying
qd < pd
qh
ph
− pl
(
ql
pl
−
qh
ph
)
(8)
(qh, ph) is quality salient.
Proof. First notice that σ (·, ·) defined in (1) is homogenous
of degree zero. Thus, σ (ah, ā) = σ (ah/ā, 1), where ah/ā > 1.
Therefore, we have that σ (qh, q̄) > σ (ph, p̄) if and only if qh/q̄ >
ph/p̄.
4 B. Bakó and G. Neszveda / Economics Letters 193 (2020) 109265
Given that ql/pl > qh/ph we have that the price attribute
is salient in C , thus (ql, pl) is being chosen from C by the local
thinker. If adding (qd, pd) (the decoy good) to the choice set makes
quality salient, then (qh, ph) becomes preferred over (ql, pl) by the
local thinker in Cd. Consider a decoy good for which
qh
ph
>
q̄
p̄
or
qhpl + qhpd > phql + phqd.
From this we have that if the decoy good is designed in that way
that satisfies
qd < pd
qh
ph
− pl
(
ql
pl
−
qh
ph
)
(9)
then the (qh, ph) is quality salient which guaranties that it is
preferred to (ql, pl).
To show that the decoy (an asymmetrically dominated) good is
never chosen over (qh, ph) consider the following. For any (qd, pd)
satisfying (8) we have that qdpd <
qh
ph
<
ql
pl
. If pd ≥ ph, then (qd, pd)
is dominated by (qh, ph). On the other hand, if pd < ph, quality is
salient thus (qh, ph) is preferred to (qd, pd) if
(qH − qh) − δ(pL − ph) < (qH − qd) − δ(pL − pd)
or
qh − qd > δ(ph − pd)
which is always satisfied whenever (9) holds. □
Proposition 3 suggests that if the decoy good’s attributes
(quality and price) are such that the average (reference) good’s
quality/price ratio is smaller than the quality/price ratio of the
high quality good, then the quality of the high quality good
is salient and thus the local regret thinker will overvalue it.
Therefore, if the decoy (asymmetrically dominated) good is not
exceptionally cheap and therefore attractive for the decision
maker, she will choose the high quality good.
In the same vein it can be shown that decision makers may
shift their choice from (ql, pl) to (qh, ph) after a (qd, pd) option is
added to the choice set, for which qd > qh and pd > ph holds.
This effect is known as the compromise effect in the literature
(Simonson, 1989).
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